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Although the exegeses on Deleuze are growing in 
number, one dedicated to the complex and dynamic aspect of 
transcendental empiricism is yet to be found in Anne 
Sauvagnargues’  Deleuze,  L’empirisme transcendantal (Paris: 
PUF, 2010).  The author is Maître de Conférences in Art 
Philosophy at École Normale Supérieure Lyon and is generally 
recognized as a specialist in Deleuze’s work, having published 
Deleuze et l'art at PUF publishing house in 2005.   
The formal content of this book could be described as 
having fifteen chapters without the introduction and 
conclusion. We will first present the main characteristics of the 
objectives that compose the exegetic foundation of this book and 
subsequently we will describe briefly the explicative core of 
each chapter. The structure and the aims of Souvagnargues’ 
exegesis on Deleuze can be rounded up as a methodic attempt 
to explain Différence et répétition acknowledging that it 
comprises in a transversal manner all the directions by which 
Deleuze has constructed the philosophical project of 
transcendental empiricism from one book to another.  META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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Following this hermeneutic statement, we observe that 
the elaborated construction of transcendental empiricism 
implies a double dynamic lecture that explores the theoretical 
clusters of Kant’s philosophy, twisting the transcendental and 
opening it towards the empirical. This dynamic lecture implies, 
on the other hand, the cartographic folds concerning the 
relation that Deleuze establishes between diverse authors as a 
historic line that grasps the evolution of his thought.  
The intensive reform of Kant’s project envisages 
different theoretical cuts that will supply in Différence et 
répétition a veritable analytic of the Difference. These points of 
departure in respect to Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
reunite: the signs in Nietzsche, the theory of faculties in Kant, 
Proust and the image of the thought, Bergson with the virtual 
and the two multiplicities, Spinoza and the etiology with the 
structural theses on the sense regarded as a surface effect 
between differentiated series, Maimon and his genetic critique 
of Kant, Simondon with his intensive theory of the Idea, and 
last but not least, Blanchot, Foucault and Guattari.  (pp. 12-15, 
23, 71, 112, 171, 212, 227, 301)  
The first chapter deals with the manner in which 
Deleuze is interpreting Kant and the concrete determination 
that is announced by transcendental empiricism. First of all, 
Deleuze’s concern in reading Kant is the “crack of time” 
between the a priori syntheses of the ‘I Think’ and the 
empirical and psychological self. These two functions of the 
subject are found disconnected in respect to each other, given 
that the universal function of ‘I Think’ doubles and glides the 
empirical Self as his transcendental condition, making thus “I 
Think” to oppose and determine the empirical Self. Two 
consequences can be raised from this: a) the philosophy of 
difference starts from the subject “cracked” by time b) the 
Deleuzean philosophy as a continuation of the Kantian 
subversive adventure formulates a transcendental field cleared 
of any substantial avatars, reloaded as an impersonal field 
without subject. With the contributions of Simondon, Deleuze 
was able to formulate a rationalist theory of impersonal and 
pre-individual singularities which is able to a.) liberate the 
individualization of the unitary form of the Self and,  b.) break BOOK REVIEWS 
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with the firm ontology of the substance proposing a doctrine of 
becoming and individualization, thus rejecting an 
anthropocentric view on philosophy (pp. 23, 26-27).   
The second chapter is concerned with the meaning of the 
“image of thought”. This concept forged by Deleuze intends to 
clarify the importance of what the thought has to say about 
itself, its limits and power in the archaeology of the images that 
expressed it through the history of philosophy, as though 
representing reality, its natural relation with truth, the 
common sense as a guarantee of commune and reliable 
knowledge, etc. A positive assignation of this concept is derived 
from the creative agenda regarding the dispositions of thought; 
an image of thought relates to a new modality of straining the 
language, of linking things one to another, etc. Philosophy 
means accepting the multiform foundation of thought in respect 
to itself and to what it historically engenders (pp. 42-44). 
The third, fourth and sixth chapter are concentrated 
upon the analysis of Deleuze’s book on Proust. First of all, the 
analysis tries to specify the distinct interpretations regarding 
the theme of Proust’s novel, À la recherche du temps perdu, as a 
search of truth and as being connected to the tensioned relation 
with Kant’s transcendental use of faculties (pp. 52-53). While in 
Kant’s philosophy each faculty is driven to its superior exercise 
regarding its a priori legislating status concerning the object, 
and by this it determines its domain of application, in Deleuze’s 
Proust each faculty is triggered into its transcendental use by 
the action of the signs. The typology of the faculties commands 
the plurality of the signs scanned by Deleuze in Proust’s novel, 
À la recherche du temps perdu. This typology follows and 
orchestrates the initiatory itinerary of the narrator passing 
from a world to another, from the sphere of snobbism to the one 
of jealousy, from the emotions triggered by the sensible 
qualities to the experience assumed by art (pp. 74-75). 
Souvagnargues produces an interesting critique regarding the 
status of sign in the hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur, in 
relation with the problematic of sign raised by Deleuze in his 
exegesis on Proust (pp. 127-128). 
The fifth chapter focuses on the reevaluation of 
Bergson’s main concepts in Deleuze’s Différence et répétition. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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First of all, the three temporal syntheses reveal, up to a point, 
our profound relation with time: a) the passive synthesis of 
habit which introduces the actual present continually changing 
our past, b) the synthesis of memory which concerns the virtual 
past and the pure being, c) the active synthesis of the future. As 
Souvagnargues explains, we have to deal here with a concept of 
becoming that engulfs the three Kantian transcendental 
syntheses with the temporal ekstases of Heidegger (pp. 96-97). 
The second Bergsonian theme in Deleuze’s philosophy is given 
by the problematic of the two multiplicities. In brief, we are 
talking about qualitative multiplicities that correspond to 
duration and virtuality and about quantitative, discrete 
multiplicities that correspond to material actualization. These 
two sets of multiplicities corresponding to the distinction 
between actual matter and virtual duration envisage a new 
image of thought (pp. 104-105). 
The seventh chapter is concerned with the boiling points 
of Deleuze reading Spinoza. Starting with the main theme of 
Spinoza’s philosophy – the fight against the transcendence of 
Being, we obtain a harsh critique of analogy, eminence and 
allegory. Through the concept of expression, Deleuze unravels, 
in the same time, a critique of the theological tradition of 
analogy and the coherent, immanent and univocal philosophy of 
Spinoza. In a few words, Being expresses itself through 
attributes, which, in their own turn, express themselves in 
modes, which express a change or a modification in substance. 
Individualization in modes is explained in two ways; firstly, it is 
effectuated under a regime of differentiation of power in respect 
to the substance and, secondly, by considering attributes in 
terms of relation of bodies under certain laws. Another 
important aspect is given by the theory of effects similar with 
Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals as ground for a comparative, 
typological characterization of modes of life. Finally, the 
philosophy of Spinoza is understood by Deleuze through the 
relation with the structuralism, mainly having in mind the 
concept of hecceites, related to the complex theory of singularity 
elaborated by Deleuze (pp. 150-151, 162-164, 170).  
The eighth chapter is surveying Deleuze’s Logique du 
sens. The problem of sense springs from the elaboration of the BOOK REVIEWS 
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concept of structure, understood as multiplicity which ensures 
to its terms a derivative, random, transitory place on the 
surface given by their encounter as events. Deleuze emphasizes 
the differentiating value of the structure that systematically 
produces its terms and confers them a sense through their own 
position in this combinatory form of the structure, and not 
through the analysis of essence conceived as a unity of sign and 
sense (pp. 174, 192-193). 
The ninth chapter is concerned with the problematic of 
the first two books of Deleuze, on Hume and Nietzsche. What 
they have in common is the re-thinking of Kant’s 
transcendental project starting from the concern Hume has in 
the practical roots of the subject and in the logic of relation as 
opposed to the representational ground of knowledge, and from 
the Nietzschean problem of value. Nietzsche’s genealogy is the 
genetic method that accounts for the origin of moral evaluation 
discovering typologies that clarify the specific direction of 
Kantian axiology. In this direction we can see Nietzsche’s 
philosophical affinities with Solomon Maimon concerning 
genealogy as genetic method and the relation of forces as a 
differentiating principle (pp. 213-214, 222-224).   
The next three chapters are concerned with the 
influence of Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of biology in 
Deleuze’s intensive reading of Kant and in the elaboration of 
transcendental empiricism in Différence et répétition. The lines 
of attack driven by Simondon are directed towards the 
supposition related to the process of individualization and call 
to abandon any ontology that would ground the emergence of 
individuality in the pre-existence of individuated terms – 
whether we talk about matter and form, sender and receiver. 
We have the three main principles of individuation that come 
under Simondon’s sustained attack: a) atomism, understood as 
unit measure which composes the minimal organization and 
quantifies degrees of order; b) the expression of the unilateral 
relation between model and copy, which reinstates the Platonic 
archetype; c) finally, as a source of organization which is 
separated from matter or ‘substrate-independent’ - the latest 
heir of the Aristotelian hylemorphism. Individuation, in 
general, can only take place by drawing on a pre-individual META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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field, a ‘metastable’ domain composed of disparate virtualities. 
Simondon, drawing on scientific studies of crystallization, 
rethinks the process of individuation as the result of the 
introduction of a ‘form’ in the guise of a structural ‘germ’ which 
catalyses the actualization and reciprocal interaction of some of 
the virtualities which remained, up to this point, at the pre-
individual level. The concept of the “disparate” is particularly 
important for an understanding of Simondon’s philosophy of 
interaction, and as a consequence, for Deleuze. Drawn from the 
physiological term used for the integration of non-
superimposable retinal images into unified visual perception, 
Simondon uses the idea of ‘disparation’ to reflect how 
individuation implies the emergence of a form of 
communication between hitherto incommensurable orders or 
potentials towards actually differentiated beings. The role of 
Simondon (constantly related to Bergson) and of his theory of 
individuation is vital in Deleuze’s ontogenetic rethinking of 
structuralism and of the transcendental, helping him to think 
through operations that permit the passage from virtually 
differentiated Ideas to actually differentiated beings. Deleuze, 
related to Simondon, will reconsider structures as neither 
immaterial essences, nor formal invariants, but instead as the 
pre-individual grounds of individuation (pp. 243, 255, 275, 296, 
306, 325). 
  The thirteenth chapter is focused on the elaboration of 
the concept of “problematic”, first of all regarding Lautman’s 
heritage and, further, on a broad discussion conjuring the 
virtual and the actual in terms of the “problematic”. What 
Deleuze specifically draws from Lautman is a relational logic 
that designates a process of production or genesis, which has 
the value of introducing a general theory of relations, theory 
which unites the structural considerations of the differential 
calculus with the concept of ‘the generation of quantities’. The 
process of the genesis of mathematical theories offered as 
solutions to mathematical problems corresponds to the 
Deleuzian account of the construction of concepts as solutions to 
philosophical problems (pp. 335-337, 345). 
  The final chapters regroup the thematic of the previous 
ones for a brief contraction opposing hermeneutics to a BOOK REVIEWS 
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transversal dimension that switches the aim of reading from 
finding a raw sense to experimentation, as we can see in Proust 
or in Foucault’s diagonal analysis. Another procedural tactic 
coined by Deleuze related to the above mentioned opposition is 
a practical theory of multiplicity; in this sense we have a 
problematic enounce that traces the diagrams that phrases put 
as stake. The virtual problems are not to be found outside the 
empirical solutions that actualize those problems; however they 
are not reducible to these solutions, as an Idea is not reducible 
to a concept, and a problem to its solution (pp. 358, 369, 384). 
Despite its “flimsy” bibliography, Sauvagnargues’ 
exegesis grounds the thematic disposition of her inquiry. We 
can see at work an attentive lecture and clear, pertinent 
assumptions on the topic of Deleuze’s elaboration of 
transcendental empiricism as a critique and intensive re-
elaboration of Kant’s transcendental project, incorporating the 
different topics of each book and author that problematically 
prepared  Différence et répétition and more precisely the 
dynamic hybrid status of transcendental empiricism that sums 
Deleuze’s philosophical project. 
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